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Abstract
The way to measure individual productivity in any working environment is to track individual performance in
a working atmosphere. Individuals who work on a commission-based salary have more incentive to work
harder, thus more efficiently. The best industry which monitors productivity is clearly the game of baseball,
due to its uncanny ability to measure productivity through the countless statistics that are available. Using
these statistics, owners can use information to determine what each player should be paid for his services.
With the advent of free agency in 1974, statistics became vital information in determining individual salary,
with the free agent market clearly setting what each player should be paid for his given statistics.
This article is available in The Park Place Economist: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol13/iss1/12
29The Park Place Economist, Volume XIII
I. INTRODUCTION
The way to measure individual productivity inany working environment is to track individ-ual performance in a working atmosphere.
Individuals who work on a commission-based salary
have more incentive to work harder, thus more effi-
ciently.  The best industry which monitors productiv-
ity is clearly the game of baseball, due to its uncanny
ability to measure productivity through the countless
statistics that are available.  Using these statistics,
owners can use information to determine what each
player should be paid for his services.  With the
advent of free agency in 1974, statistics became vital
information in determining individual salary, with the
free agent market clearly
setting what each player
should be paid for his
given statistics.   
In recent history
however, a disturbing
trend has been estab-
lished within the con-
fines of Major League
Baseball (MLB), which
states that the rich get richer and the poor get poorer.
This is important because there are only a handful of
teams which can financially support the best players.
If the majority of teams in MLB cannot afford the
best players, they cannot expect to contend for a
World Series.  
Within the past 5 years, there have been some
encouraging developments to renounce the trend.
Oakland, Anaheim, Minnesota, San Francisco, and
Florida have advanced into post-season play despite
not being big spenders (Lewis, 2003).  Most notably,
these teams have not acquired talent from the cate-
gories of what history says is statistically significant.
Instead of paying top-dollar for home runs and strike-
outs, they have found individual bargains who main-
tain high on-base-percentage (OBP) who have
slipped though the cracks of the market.  With so
many different theories amongst player personnel, it
is easy to get confused about which statistics matter
the most.  This study will attempt to settle the classic
argument of which baseball statistic is the best meas-
ure of team success.  
II. THEORY
The underlying economic theory within the
game of baseball is undoubtedly the human capital
theory, which states that players will be paid for their
productivity; fortunately
for baseball productivity
can be readily measured
by the plethora of per-
formance statistics
available on the internet.
According to common
baseball knowledge,
higher than average sta-
tistics at both the individ-
ual and the team level should bolster the amount of
wins each team has annually.  According to Gary
Becker (1975), the idea of the human capital model
of investment is that increases in human capital,
which are measured by statistics, lead to an increase
in productivity of the team, which leads to an
increase in wages.
Theoretically, the team that wins the most
games should have the best players.  Since they have
the best players, they should have the best statistics.
Better productivity measures (statistics) should lead
to an increase in player wages.  Hence, the best team
should have the highest payroll amount.  However,
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previous literature (Blass, 1992) has shown that theo-
retically the human capital model of investment does
not hold in baseball.  This is due to the nature of base-
ball’s collective bargaining agreement and arbitration
process.  Generally speaking, Blass (1992) found that
players are underpaid when they are younger and
overpaid when they are older, which is a violation of
the human capital theory.  
The profit-maximizing firm will attempt to
field a budget in an effort that receipts are equivalent
to expenditures.  However, this notion is skewed
when taking into account the effects of on-the-job-
training.  Becker (1975) has successfully claimed that
firms will increase their on-the-job-training in an
effort to either lower future expenditures or increase
future receipts of the firm.  The type of training
offered by firms can either be specific or general.
General training increas-
es marginal productivity
of trainees by exactly the
same amount in the
firms providing the
training as in other
firms.  In specific train-
ing, the marginal pro-
ductivity of the individ-
ual is increased specifically for that firm.  The type of
training offered in baseball is general training.
Baseball skills are not team specific; what works for
one team will most likely work for another.  Firms
invest in training in an effort to increase human capi-
tal, which could potentially lead to an increase in pro-
ductivity in the worker, which would ultimately bring
the firm more revenue.  
In relation to the topic at hand, teams in Major
League Baseball gladly spend top-dollar for the best
players in an effort to increase their ability to win
baseball games.  It should also be noted that this
increase in firm expenditures can be offset by an
increase in receipts.  If the player is successful and
helps the team win more games, attendance at home
games will increase and thus, profitability of the firm
increases and the increase in firm expenditures is off-
set.  Thus, in order to field the best team possible,
teams should invest heavily in training; which in this
case is player productivity, if they want to win as
many games as possible.
This theory sounds very elitist, and it suggests
that the teams from smaller market cities cannot com-
pete with the likes of the Yankees, Red Sox, Dodgers,
and Cubs among others.  In fact, Zimbalist (2003) did
research on this topic and concluded that payroll size
is the biggest factor of teams in the playoffs.  As it
was previously noted however, there are several
examples in the past few years in which teams made
it to the post-season without fielding a huge payroll
(Lewis, 2003).
To complicate matters even more, the vast
majority of teams in major league baseball cannot
afford the best free-agents because of the fact that
their fan base is limited; hence their ability to
increase attendance is marginal at best.  These teams
are un-willing to increase their expenditures in an
effort to increase the success of their teams.  Rather
they have found loop-holes in the economic set-up of
major league baseball, in which several sets of skills
are under-valued in the market for Major League
Baseball players.  The
Oakland A’s and several
other teams have found
great success by fielding
a competitive team by
stressing on-base-per-
centage and keeping
payroll relatively con-
stant.  Later on in this
research paper, I plan to determine if Michael Lewis’
(2003) claim that n-base-percentage is indeed the best
statistic in measuring the team success, in this case
number of wins.
III. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The inspiration I had for under-taking this
research project occurred this past summer, when I
read Lewis’s (2003) document entitled Moneyball.
This book laid the groundwork for which I plan to
proceed with my investigations.  This book followed
the Oakland A’s, a team able to stay extremely com-
petitive while having a payroll a fraction of their
competitors.  The way they remained competitive
was searching for players with high on-base-percent-
age (OBP), which the market for ballplayers under-
valued.  In fact, the book suggested that “the market
for baseball players was so inefficient, and the gener-
al grasp of sound baseball strategy so weak, that
superior management could still run circles around
taller piles of cash.” (Lewis, 2003) This quote was
not from a baseball front office executive, rather from
the mouth of Paul Volcker, who led an investigation
into the economic situation of professional sports for
“Players are underpaid when they
are younger and overpaid when
they are older.”
the US government in 1999.  
Scully’s (1989) results stated that OPS is the
best statistic in determining winning percentage.
However, since 1989 many aspects of the game have
changed, most notably the expansionary measures
taken within the game of baseball.  For example,
homeruns have increased at an exponential rate, pay-
rolls have increased massively and the disparity
between payrolls has been ever increasing. Many
aspects have changed, but has theory tested 15 years
ago remained the same until present day?
Cook’s Percentage Baseball (1964) was far
ahead of it’s time when it was published.  The author
used economic regressions to question several strate-
gies: such as the sacrifice bunt, attempt to steal a
base, when to change pitchers, etc.  The results were
in a direct contrast with those mentioned in Lewis’
(2003) Moneyball. Cook concluded that the sacrifice
bunt and stolen base were strategic necessities for
managers in ballgames.  Lewis (2003) argued 40
years later that the sacrifice bunt and attempt to steal
a base significantly lower the amount of runs teams
are predicted to score.  
This research project will attempt to answer
the age-old debate and hopefully shed new knowl-
edge as to which single statistic is the best when
determining team wins. 
IV. DATA
This study will test
the following hypotheses:
Teams with higher win totals
will have better offensive sta-
tistics. Teams with better
offensive statistics will have
higher payroll figures. OBP
will be the best statistic in
determining team wins.  
The reason why
Lewis (2003) and the
Oakland A’s like OBP so much is because of the fact
that OBP includes walks, whereas the more common
batting average does not.  The ability to get on base
significantly increases the projected number of runs
the team will score per game (www.baseballprospec-
tus.com).  Since batting average overlooks this sim-
ple fact, many have argued successfully that batting
average is the most over-used statistic in all of major
league baseball
To successfully test my hypotheses, data will
be compiled of team statistics for every team in base-
ball from the years 2000-04.  This data is readily
available at www.mlb.com.  I am testing the on-base-
percentage in an effort to determine whether or not
Lewis’ claim is valid.  The dependent variable in this
equation will be the number of wins that the team has
in the corresponding year. 
I have excluded earned-run-average, a very
common pitching statistic, from my regression
because of the fact that it accounts for errors in the
equation.  The ruling for whether or not a ball in play
is an error or a base hit is subject to one person’s
opinion, and can vary heavily from team-to-team.
Also, faster players may reach a ball that a normal
player would not make, and still make an error.
Whereas the slower player would not have come
close to the ball, so it would have been a base hit.  An
example that ERA is not a very good statistic comes
this past baseball season by the Boston Red Sox.
Between the months of May and July, Boston’s
record was merely 41-40 despite leading the major
leagues in ERA and most offensive statistics.  The
reason that Boston did not have a very good record
was because of their atrocious defense they displayed
every night that usually led to a few unearned runs
per game.
V. EMPIRICAL MODEL
Within the design of my research, I plan to
use a simple OLS regression to find the results of my
study.  I will use multiple regressions to test my mul-
tiple hypotheses because of the fact of the very likely
probability I will incur omitted variable bias issues if
I do not run multiple regressions.  The data was taken
from a time-series panel over the last 5 years.  Tables
1 and 2 will be the format for my OLS regressions.
The parentheses indicate the predicted signs for each
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TABLE 1 
Empirical Model 1  
Dependent Variable  
Wins Number of team wins annually  
Explanatory Variables  
BA        (+)  Batting average (hits/at bats)  
OBP     (+)  On-Base-Percentage [(hits+ walks) / at bats]  
SLG     (+)  Slugging Percentage [(hits + 2B + {3B*2} + {Home Runs*3}) / AB]  
STL      (+)  Percentage of successful stolen base attempts per team  
WHIP    (-) (Walks + Hits) / Innings Pitched  
K per 9 (+)  Strikeouts per 9 Innings Pitched (Total strikeouts / innings pitched)  
Field     (+)  Fielding Perc entage 
Payroll (+)  Team budgeted payroll amount  
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explanatory variable.
I will also run a 2nd regression to test the 2nd
piece of my hypothesis.  All statistics used in this
regression are exactly the same as the above regres-
sion.  This model will give accurate figures for what
high revenue teams pay for.  
I will also run a final test to see if I can deter-
mine which single team statistic is the best when
attempting to explain team wins.  To accomplish this,
I plan on testing every explanatory variable individu-
ally against team wins.  The baseball statistic with the
highest concentration of coefficients, T-statistics, and
significance values will be the variable that I will
conclude to be the best when determining team wins.
The process had in determining which statistics I
would test was rather simple.  I came across an
ESPN.com article which a writer determined to be
the most important statistics in baseball.  For my
research, I used some, but not all of the listed stats.  
A. Offensive Statistics
Previous research indicates that offensive sta-
tistics are by far the most effective way of empirical-
ly testing baseball statistics.  Hence, that is why this
regression includes mostly offensive stats.  I chose
the listed stats because of the fact that they are all
extremely measurable and because of the fact that
previous literature has told me that they are important
in not only team success, but when testing empirical
research as well.  
B. Pitching Statistics
In order to measure pitching, the statistics of
WHIP and Strikeouts per nine innings have been cho-
sen.  I wanted to include stats such as ERA and Saves,
but I felt that they would
not be good fits in the
regression.  As was previ-
ously mentioned, ERA is
not a good measure because
of the fact it is so subject to
errors and WHIP is not.
And since the process of
ruling a play a hit or an
error is very arbitrary, I did
not include it in the regres-
sion.  Although I anticipate
that ERA would be statisti-
cally significant at the .01
level, it would be biased
and therefore, not a good fit.  I could have included
Saves, but they are subject to amount of wins.  A team
cannot get a Save if it does not win the game.  Again,
Saves would in all likelihood be statistically signifi-
cant at the .01 level of output, but they too would be
biased.
C. Defensive Statistics
In this regression I included fielding percent-
age in an effort to test if fielding percentage is impor-
tant in determining number of wins.  Fielding per-
centage takes some measure of errors into the equa-
tion, so hopefully there will be some significance.
However, as was previously stated the process is
completely arbitrary.  A faster player may reach a fly
ball that a slower player would not, and get penalized
with an error whereas a slower player would not
reach the ball and it would be ruled a base hit.
Because of this fact, defensive statistics are not meas-
ured with as much certainty as offensive statistics are.
There is no concrete, undisputable way to measure
defensive productivity as there exists with offense.
Even the players judged to be the best defensive play-
ers annually are subject to sports writer’s opinions,
which can vary from person to person.  Although I do
not expect fielding percentage to be statistically sig-
nificant, perhaps this test will at least show if it is
considered important at all.
IV. RESULTS
The first regression will test significance for
statistics in determining number of team wins annu-
ally.  The results are a direct result from the model in
Table 1 above.  For independent variables, the
unstandardized coefficients, t-statistics, and signifi-
TABLE 2 
Empirical Model 2  
Dependent Variable  
Payroll Team budged payroll amount  
Explanatory Variables  
BA         (+)  Batting average (hits/ at bats)  
OBP      (+)  On-Base-Percentage [(hits + walks)  / at bats]  
SLG       (+)  Slugging Percentage [(hits + 2B + {3B*2} + {Home Runs*3}) / AB]  
STL       (+)  Percentage of successful stolen base attempts per team  
WHIP      ( -) Walks + Hits / Innings Pitched  
K per 9  (+)  Strikeouts per 9 Innings Pitched (T otal strikeouts / innings pitched)  
Field      (+)  Fielding Percentage  
cance values are presented for the first regression
below in Table 3.
Within this regression, there are three signifi-
cant variables at the .01 level; on-base-percentage,
slugging percentage, and WHIP.  I am not surprised at
all that these three are considered to be statistically
significant because of the fact that they are all on the
Gammons’ list on ESPN.com of the most important
statistics (2004).  Also, pre-
vious literature told me that
these three would be among
the most statistically signifi-
cant (Sommers, 1992). 
It came as a surprise
to me that batting average,
the most common statistic in
all of baseball, had a nega-
tive relationship with wins
when I predicted it would
have a positive one.
Theoretically, it makes sense
that teams with higher batting averages should have
higher win totals, but this regression points to other
conclusions.  Also, strikeouts per nine innings had a
different sign than I predicted.  The more strikeouts a
team’s pitching staff has, the fewer amount of balls
that are put into play.  If fewer balls are put into play,
then it should lower the expected run total for the bat-
ting team.  If expected run totals for the opposing
team are lowered, then one can assume that strikeouts
should help teams win more games, as opposed to
losing more as my results suggest.
The most interesting finding of my first
regression however, is the fact that payroll has
absolutely no relationship at all to wins, which con-
tradicts my earlier research findings and it also con-
tradicts the recent history of teams making the play-
offs in major league baseball.  One possible explana-
tion is the fact that other
variables are simply more
important, therefore a
statistic like payroll could
potentially be pushed to
the back in terms of sig-
nificance.  However, later
on when I test each statis-
tic individually against
wins I think I will get a
better gauge of just how
significant payroll is.  
The second regression
test will test my wsecond hypothesis, which stated
that teams with better offensive statistics will have
higher payroll figures.  The model for this is listed in
Table 2.  The results are in the same format as Table
3 and are below.
This regression only has two significant val-
ues: slugging percentage at the .05 level and strike-
outs per nine innings at the .01 level.  It does not sur-
prise me that those two statistics are the only statisti-
cally significant variables because variables can be
described as “sexy”, and appeal to fans very much.
Teams with high slugging percentages have extraor-
dinary amounts of extra-base hits, which include dou-
bles, triples, and home runs.  Because the average
baseball fan is fascinated by home runs in this current
era of baseball, the demand for players who can hit
home runs has increased exponentially within the last
15 years.  Because the demand for these players has
increased, it makes sense that their salaries have
increased as well.  If those players who have the abil-
ity to hit homeruns and extra base hits are grouped
together on one team, theory states that the payroll of
that team must be high; therefore one can conclude
that money buys extra base hits and home runs.  
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TABLE 3 
Regression Results: Predicting Wins  
Explanatory Variable  â Std. Error  t Sig. 
(Constant)  -174.417 167.798 -1.039 0.3 
BA -94.887 76.421 -1.242 0.216 
OBP 403.729 62.577 6.452 0 
SLG 139.462 30.517 4.57 0 
STL 0.062 0.076 0.808 0.421 
WHIP -92.798 5.87 -15.808 0 
K per 9 -0.908 0.731 -1.241 0.217 
Field 221.541 171.919 1.289 0.2 
Payroll n/a n/a 0.054 0.957 
R^2 = .849             n = 150  
TABLE 4 
Regression Results: Pre dicting Payroll Factor  
Explanatory Variables  â Std. Error t Sig. 
(Constant)  500268775.63  787317572.62  0.635 0.526 
BA -278249287.9  358323736.35  -0.777 0.439 
OBP 15437463.69  294027844.27  0.053 0.958 
SLG 353576689.88  140287961.61  2.52 0.013 
STL 215789.271 357458.957 0.604 0.547 
WHIP -88916811.67  26554794.19  1.941 0.054 
K per 9 6581810.157  3391805.723  -3.348 0.001 
Field -458054278.4  806884175.00  -0.568 0.571 
R2 = .241           n = 150  
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Strikeouts per nine innings were also shown
to be even more statistically significant than slugging
percentage, which comes as a small surprise to me.
Although strikeouts are certainly entertaining and to
the author, there is nothing better than watching a
classic pitcher’s duel, I would have expected the
owners of teams to place a higher premium on home
runs than on strikeouts.  
Like power hitters, power pitchers have seen
their salaries increase at a faster than normal rate in
recent history.  Players entering free agency with the
ability to strikeout numerous hitters are usually
rewarded more handsomely than a pitcher that relies
on change of speeds and deception.  For example, last
February when Greg Maddux was a free agent, he
signed with the Cubs for an average of $8 million per
season.  However, Kerry Wood was also entering free
agency at the same time and the Cubs resigned him
for an average of $10.5 million per season.  There are
many reasons for this disparity between the two, but
when comparing
strikeouts among
the two, Wood
averages far
more strikeouts
than Maddux.
H o w e v e r ,
Maddux has won
a Major League
Baseball record
at least 15 base-
ball games as a
pitcher for the
last 16 years.  Wood has failed to win 15 games once
in his career.  It seems as money was not spent wise-
ly in this case.
An interesting result of this study so far finds
that Tables 3 and 4 do not match: i.e. the owners are
overpaying for the wrong players for the wrong sta-
tistics.  A possible explanation for this come from
simple economics: if the owners are profit-maximiz-
ers, they will field a team that can sell out the stadi-
um everyday. Table 4 clearly states that owners
should maximize home runs and strikeouts.  Fans will
enjoy the excitement that this team brings, and will
ultimately bring the owner a greater source of rev-
enue.
However, if owners are profit-maximizers,
they are not necessarily going to field a team that has
the best chance of winning a championship, which
should be the goal of every owner in every sport.  If
the goal of an owner isn’t to win a championship,
then they are in the wrong business.  Most likely, the
team that doesn’t win the maximum amount of games
possible will eventually suffer a decline in atten-
dance.  Previous research the author has done has
revealed that team success is correlated with atten-
dance at the highest level of output (Houser, 2004).
According to that theory, owners should field a team
that wins the more games and the fans will come
through the gates.  It is most likely going to be more
cost-effective to field a team with a lower payroll that
wins more games in the long run.
For the following regression each explanatory
variable was tested independently against team wins,
in an effort to determine which statistic is the most
statistically significant when determining the amount
of wins per team.  
The above table was not a complete regres-
sion, hence excluded is any values for the constant
because each of the explanatory variables was tested
independently.  The variables with the highest
absolute value t-statistics are deemed to be the most
statistically significant.  Under the above table,
WHIP, OBP, and SLG are the most important vari-
ables.  These same variables also have the highest
listed R^2 values in the regressions.  I do not think
that it is a coincidence that these are the same exact
variables that Table 3 listed as statistically significant.
Rather, they are the most important statistic when
determining team wins.  
In relation to my hypothesis, as was stated
earlier, I stated that I thought that OBP would be the
most important of all statistics tested.  However,
Table 5 clearly states that WHIP is more important
than on-base percentage.  I think it is extremely inter-
esting that the two most statistically significant vari-
Adam Houser
TABLE 5 
Regression Results: Best Statistic  
Explanatory Variables  â Std. Error  t Sig. R^2  
BA 591.768 82.312 7.189 0 0.259 
OBP 605.572 59.435 10.189 0 0.412 
SLG 285.704 33.741 8.468 0 0.326 
STL 0.466 0.181 2.572 0.011 0.043 
WHIP -97.222 8.49 -11.451 0 0.47 
K per 9 7.092 1.417 5.004 0 0.145 
Field 1931 344.736 5.601 0 0.175 
Payroll n/a n/a 5.285 0 0.159 
ables are both statistics that record number of base
runners per game and number of base runners
allowed per game.  With the vast amount of statistics
available and tested, I can conclude that in order to
win more games, all you have to do is have more base
runners than your opponent.  This statement may
seem extremely obvious, but with the recent fascina-
tion with home runs, it appears that home runs are not
as important as current markets say they are.  It is sat-
isfying to the author that at its core, the game of base-
ball remains very simple: get base runners on base
and you stand a great chance of winning the game.
Since slugging percentage is not as statistically sig-
nificant, teams that do not have the capability to
spend large amounts of money can still remain com-
petitive if they invest heavily in OBP, which fortu-
nately for them is still extremely undervalued in the
market for baseball players.  
Even Paul Volcker’s statement that the market
for baseball players is so weak and incorrect is
proven to be correct by this theory.  Empirical tests
have shown that teams with high payroll’s continual-
ly overpay for slugging percentage when in fact
Lewis’ claim that on base percentage is a better way
to win baseball games.  Hence, the theory that the
Oakland A’s have taken in the last decade or so is the
most efficient theory to date.  According to Table 4,
which measured payroll against statistics, OBP has a
significance value of only .958, which suggests that
teams that spend heavily spend their money in all the
wrong ways.  
VII. CONCLUSIONS
My findings show that the best way to field a
team is by investing heavily in WHIP and on base
percentage.  Although Major League Baseball is not
likely to expand to any new markets anytime soon,
when they do it will be interesting to see how deci-
sion makers build their personnel on those teams.
Recently, Tampa Bay was awarded a franchise and
they invested extremely heavily in home runs and
slugging percentage as opposed to pitching and on
base percentage.  As a result, their record plummeted
and their fan base dwindled.  Within the past couple
of years, their payrolls have been the lowest in base-
ball by far (www.usatoday.com/mlb/payroll).
In 2003, Alex Rodriguez made more money
annually than every player of the Tampa Bay Devil
Rays combined (Lewis, 2003).  This philosophy error
cost Tampa Bay a chance at being competitive for at
least 10 years.  Now Tampa Bay is focusing their
drafting efforts and free agent signings through pitch-
ing, defense, and on base percentage.  It may take
several years, but eventually I would expect them to
be able to field a competitive team, something they
have not been able to do in the history of their fran-
chise.  Although they still cannot afford marquee
players, if they win enough games with their payroll
at a low level, eventually they will start to increase
revenues.  Thus they would then be able to afford an
impact player that can take their team to the next
level.   
For teams with fixed budgets, which are the
vast majority of Major League Baseball, the ability to
pay players their MRP is extremely important.  The
Oakland A’s have made a habit of fielding personnel
in which the players MRP exceeded their given
salary.  To contrast, the Mets always have a payroll in
the top 5 and always seem to lose way too many
games by investing in players whose MRP is far
below what their contract pays them.  With this infor-
mation, teams have a sound theory that should allow
them to maximize the amount of wins out of their
given budget.  
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